• yemmly@lemmy.world
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    3 months ago

    Was there ever such a thing as the “real Picard” to begin with? Or is the continuity of identity just a lie we tell ourselves to keep from going mad?

  • Cagi@lemmy.ca
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    3 months ago

    This is the transporter dilemma, too. Disintegrating people kills them. Making a long range replicator spit out an exact duplicate with all their memories doesn’t mean they’ve moved.

    • AwkwardLookMonkeyPuppet@lemmy.world
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      3 months ago

      My son and I talked at length about this one, and we agree with Bones. You wouldn’t get me to go through a transporter unless I was already going to die. If there’s any sort of afterlife, or soul, then that’s where the people who have been transported are, and everyone else is a facsimile of themselves.

      • Cagi@lemmy.ca
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        3 months ago

        No because you didn’t disintegrate my brain. Being disintegrated is a catastrophic, fatal injury that destroys the body, not just an imperceptible change like naturally ageing by one second.

        • MxM111@kbin.social
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          3 months ago

          There is exactly the same imperceivable change for you when you appear on another side. And you-one-sec-ago do not exist anymore in both cases. What’s the difference? Just because you use the word “disintegrated”? Use the word transformed instead.

          • Cagi@lemmy.ca
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            3 months ago

            The end result is an identical entity, certainly. But in-between, your matter is broken apart, converted into energy, reconverted back into matter before it becomes the same again. Becoming a data-stream, or a jumble of particles is a very different thing than being a corporeal biological being, and that’s the state the concerns me.